Ki Teitzei 5784: Compassion and Limits

Welcome to the Pardes Parsha podcast.

My name is Tzvi Hirschfeld, and I have the distinct privilege and pleasure of discussing

the profound analysis and deep insights into the Parsha from my wonderful colleagues at

the Pardes Institute.

So glad you could join us.

We are already on the Parshat Ki Titzé.

Time keeps moving along here, and I am thrilled and delighted to have my friend and coach

teacher, and also a teacher of mine on many, many things, and my neighbor, Rabbi Michael

Hatton.

Michael, welcome.

Thank you very much, Tzvi.

It's a pleasure to be here once again.

Well, at least he's smiling, everybody, so it looks like he might be enjoying himself.

I'll let you know at the end.

So here we are, Parshat Ki Titzé.

And on the one hand, you can look at this Parsha.

It's a tremendous number of mitzvot.

You'll correct me, but I think it's actually the largest number of mitzvot in any Parsha

we have in the Torah.

Moshe's doing a nice big halacha review for the Jewish people.

Although some of the mitzvot we find here are not found earlier in the Chumash.

Some are.

Am I good so far?

You're great.

See, Michael's a knowledgeable one here, so I'm checking in with him before I make any

of these statements, or at least after I make them, so we get some accuracy.

And so within this mass of mitzvot, there's one mitzvah that you wanted to focus on, and

that's the mitzvah of Shiluach Haken.

Can you describe the mitzvah that you're talking about and why you think it's important to

focus on?

Yeah.

This is a mitzvah that might actually be lost.

It might be lost in the shuffle because there's so many other mitzvot in the Parsha.

It is one of those mitzvot that's not mentioned elsewhere in the Torah, ostensibly at least.

We'll have to talk about that.

And basically what the Torah says, if you happen to come upon a mother bird that is

with its chicks or with its eggs, then you have to send the mother away before you take

the chicks or the eggs.

And this is, the Torah says, in order to lengthen your days.

Which is kind of odd, right?

Right.

That one I think a lot of listeners are like, oh, that resonates.

I understand why that's so important.

Here we have this mitzvah, which first of all, it's interesting.

This is not a mitzvah that almost anybody does.

Right.

I am told there are actually some bus groups from different neighbors in Israel that take

people out to the forest.

They want to fulfill this mitzvah.

But at first blush, you would look at it and see it's a kind of mitzvah where there's

no requirement to find it.

In other words, it's similar perhaps to divorce or even shchita, maybe, as slaughtering the

animal.

It's only in a certain case where you want to eat meat or where one wants to divorce

their spouse that the Torah provides a framework.

But here, it's just telling you, if you happen to be in this place where you want the chicks

or you want the egg, send away the mother bird.

Correct.

And just to emphasize that, it doesn't apply to a chicken coop, right?

In other words, it's not about a domesticated bird that you are raising for the eggs or

raising for the chicks.

This is ki karei kansipor, you chance upon it.

Funny story, as my kids were growing up, so there were a number of times that pigeons

roosted on their windowsill and they actually laid the eggs and they sat on the eggs and

we saw the chicks hatch.

And sort of at the back of my mind was this question, should I be sending away the mother

just so I could fulfill the mitzvah?

You could make that bracha that almost no one ever gets to make.

Al shiluach haken, I think, right?

I didn't do it, but it's not a mitzvah like you said, that one actually will come across

very often.

So help us understand why you think or what the commentaries tell us about why this mitzvah

is mentioned, what its goal is, what we're meant to be thinking about when we encounter

this sort of strange law.

I want to mention two commentaries in particular because they seem to be on the same wavelength

and both of them make some connections here that I think are helpful.

And beginning with Ibn Ezra, who's the 12th century Spanish commentary, and he basically

says the idea behind this mitzvah is pretty straightforward.

I'm going to quote and then I'll translate.

Ki achazara yutu b'lev, it is cruelty of the heart to take the mother and the children.

Right?

I mean, that's pretty straightforward.

If you take the mother and the children or the eggs and the chicks and you eat the eggs

and you kill the chicks and you kill the mother, I mean, that's pretty cruel.

That's what Ibn Ezra says.

And then he links it to two other mitzvot in the Torah.

And I think it's in this linkage that there's sort of another opportunity to think about

this as a bigger idea.

He says we have a mitzvah in Parshat Emor, which we call O Tov et P'no.

You're not allowed to slaughter the mother cow or the mother sheep or the mother goat,

whatever it is, and its offspring on the same day.

O Tov et P'no, lo tishchatu b'yom echad.

And again, the Torah doesn't tell us why.

And in Shemot, in Parshat Mishpatim,

Ibn Ezra links it to another mitzvah, which is perhaps more familiar to us.

Lo tevashel gidi b'chalev imo, do not seethe a kid in its mother's milk,

which we call halachically mixing meat and milk.

But in the strict formulation of the Torah,

it means you're not allowed to take the milk from the mother and cook the offspring in it.

And Ibn Ezra says it's all the same thing.

And I'm assuming the cruelty is just like an excessive disregard for the suffering of the animal

or the attack on the species.

How do you understand the cruelty that he's talking about?

So I think the Ibn Ezra is focusing more on the attack on the species.

And I'll sort of provide a proof text, which he does.

If you remember the story of Yaakov and Esav,

and Yaakov is in flight from his brother,

who's in a murderous rage over the taking of the blessings.

And there's going to be the showdown after 20 years.

And Yaakov prays to God.

And he says,

Save me from Esav, my brother.

I'm afraid of him.

Dearly, why?

And strike me down, mothers and children.

And it's the exact same expression.

Don't take the mother and the offspring.

So Ibn Ezra basically says,

this is an idea about showing some kind of compassion for the species.

What kind of cruelty would it be to kill the mother,

to kill the offspring, and to consume both?

So even though Ibn Ezra would,

acknowledge we can eat thousands of birds,

and we can make thousands of omelets with the eggs in principle,

the idea of taking the mother and the eggs or the chicks at that exact same moment,

almost goes too far.

We're witnessing a mother-child relationship,

and we're still attacking both at the same time.

Correct.

And Rashbam Shmuel ben Meir is going to continue with that line of thought.

And the way he puts it, again, I'll state it in the original, then translate it.

Ach zarayut, it's cruelty, that was Ibn Ezra's word as well.

V'raf tanut, glatani, lakacha, to take, to slaughter, to cook, to eat,

the mother and the children together.

What Rashbam just did in that statement

was bring together three separate mitzvahs in the Torah

that are mentioned in three separate contexts.

Okay, what are they?

Don't take the mother with the children.

Don't slaughter the mother on the same day as the children.

Don't cook the children.

Don't eat the children in the milk of the mother.

So, same list as Ibn Ezra, fundamentally.

Same list, but to sort of understand that all three things are connected to each other,

and they're about creating some sort of a larger framework.

In this case, he added the idea of, I think, if I understood you correctly,

the idea of limits, that we shouldn't take this idea of, you know, limitless taking,

seeing everything is blowing to us, everything for our use,

just grabbing what's ever there, but noticing the limit

in a sort of certain respect that I'm not supposed to annihilate this species.

I'm allowed to use the species for food,

but there are limits to what I'm supposed to take.

The term he uses for that is rav thanut, exactly,

which is, you know, gluttony, has to do with hunger,

but it's sort of like this hunger for everything all the time.

So, help us understand a little bit there.

I think, like, two questions I know emerged for me,

and I know that you've thought about them.

Number one, what about the ways in which the Torah doesn't provide even stronger limits?

Like, as I imagine that we have vegan-less,

or vegetarian listeners who say,

well, that's all well and good, but if killing animals is cruel,

then why not go the step farther and not kill any animals at all?

And, of course, the other question is a little bit wider in the sense of,

what do you make of this project,

which Rashbam and Ibn Ezra do not hesitate to do,

of trying to explain the rationale of a mitzvah

when the Torah is effectively silent about why we should do this mitzvah?

Okay, Steve, these are two excellent questions.

I want to address, you know, one at a time.

I think the answer to the first question is that, basically,

the Torah is not saying this is the final destination of the activity.

This is, as it were, some kind of a sign for us,

some sort of a direction for us.

The Torah is trying to put us on the right track.

What track is that?

The track of compassion, the track of thoughtfulness.

And if we want to take it to the next level,

I think that might even be appropriate.

I mean, it's not an accident.

It's a different discussion for a different podcast, Zvi.

But in sort of our messianic vision of the future,

vegetarianism may reign supreme,

depending on sort of, you know, which approach you're going to take, interpretively.

So you're not close to the idea that a person could say,

perhaps as we draw this cake, a random example of brachot,

which occurs in an earlier parasha, birkat ha-mazom, blessing after food,

where Chazal say, well, if the Torah is silent about this mitzvah, it's a blessing after food.

So you're not close to the idea that a person could say, perhaps as we draw this cake, a random example of brachot,

where Chazal say, well, if the Torah is silent about this mitzvah, it's a blessing after food,

The Torah thinks it's a good idea or important to make a blessing after we eat

to show gratitude and acknowledgement.

So, let's build a structure of blessings before we eat.

Because if a blessing after is good, a blessing before is probably even more helpful.

And it sounds like you're not close to the idea that here too it's not an unrealistic leap

for someone to say the Torah is offering us a certain kind of limit

on consumption of animals in certain areas.

It's not a terrible idea or against the Torah's philosophy,

on our own initiative to extend those limits.

To a degree, I'll sort of mention a question

that often comes up when I first introduce to students

the idea of not consuming meat and milk

and sort of explain it, go back to the source,

don't see the kid in his mother's milk.

And immediately the question will come up,

yeah, but how can I make a schnitzel

if I take a piece of chicken and I fry it in an egg?

So isn't that kind of the same thing?

So it is and it isn't.

And the reason why it isn't

is because birds are not the same as mammals.

And sort of the emotional life of a bird

is not the emotional life of a mammal

and it's not the emotional life of a fish.

So we have to sort of be careful how we apply

and how we expand.

Having said that, I think there's room

for some kind of a wider application.

I might even say that they were open to that idea

because they're basically telling us,

I have three separate mitzvahs.

One applies to birds, one applies to mammals,

sheep and goats and calves, right?

One applies to the act of taking the animal from nature.

One applies to the act of killing it.

One applies to the act of consuming it.

These three mitzvahs actually occur

in three separate books of the Torah.

That all leads me to the conclusion

that there's something more pervasive here.

There's something more comprehensive

that the Torah is trying to teach us.

Certainly in the way we relate to animals

and other species.

And I guess maybe you could even say

trying to figure out this balance

between on the one hand saying

we can use the animal as a tool for us to do things.

We can use these things for food

and for sustenance, even for pleasure, right?

Let's not deny that many people

enjoy eating meat and chicken.

They enjoy it from a purely sensual element

of enjoying their food.

At the same time, acknowledging

that there is a danger.

There is a place where one could go

in pursuit of this eating pleasure

that could develop very negative characteristics

in us and how we regard the natural world.

Correct.

I want to say one more thing about it,

but in order to do so,

I have to interrupt.

I want to introduce the Rambam and the Rambam.

We like the Rambam on this podcast.

We are a pro-Rambam podcast.

Absolutely.

But of course, there's different versions of the Rambam.

There's the Rambam in the Guide to the Perplexed

and there's the Rambam in the Code

and the Mishnah Torah

and they don't always say the same thing.

That's another discussion.

Anyways, in the Guide to the Perplexed,

Rambam says the following

and I'm reading it in Hebrew,

but really I should be reading it in Arabic.

But anyways.

Well, you can try.

I can try.

Do you have it memorized in Arabic?

No.

I believe your friend Nachmanides

also quoted this passage at length

on this very mitzvah.

Correct.

It starts out, I think,

in a way which very much reminds us

of Ibn Ezra and Rashbem.

This is what he says.

Ki tsa'ar ba'alei chayim bezeh gadol ma'od.

The emotional suffering

that creatures will experience

in a moment such as this,

when you take the offspring away

or you slaughter the offspring

in the presence of the mother,

gadol ma'od.

It's an incredibly emotionally painful thing.

Ein hefresh.

Ben tsa'ar ha'adam alav

ve tsa'ar shar ba'alei chayim.

There is no difference

between what a human being

would experience in that situation

and what these animals experience.

And as on an emotional level,

we're exactly the same.

We have higher intelligence.

That translates into other things.

But on this level,

the emotional,

the raw emotional visceral reaction,

it's the same.

Okay, great.

So far, like Ibn Ezra and Rashbem seemingly,

but then he adds,

ve'im chasa tora al behemot ve'ofim,

if the Torah was so concerned

with the animals and the birds,

kol sheken bivnei ha'adam kulam,

all the more so with respect to other people.

I think that's an incredibly important statement

because what it's saying is,

yes, it's about the suffering of other creatures,

but that's just a means to an end,

so to speak,

because we also have to be more sensitive,

and this is the goal,

at least for the Rambam,

towards other people.

So in a way,

the Torah is educating us about our middot,

about our character traits,

by reminding us of empathy.

And if you can have empathy for an animal,

then certainly you should have empathy

for a fellow human being.

You must.

You have to.

And if you somehow didn't,

then you missed the point.

There's a broken circuit somewhere.

If you can have empathy for another creature,

but you can't have empathy for another human being.

So are we ready to move on to that second question?

Because it leans in there in the sense,

of what do we say to the people who say,

well, that's great,

but why then does the Torah allow us to kill animals?

Why does the Torah allow us so much latitude

in the use of animals or other creatures?

There's even a debate among the later codifiers,

whether hunting is prohibited by the Torah or not.

But isn't there a danger,

I guess,

in Rambam's approach?

What happens if we want to hold that measuring stick

and say,

well, great,

if it's about compassion,

what about this mitzvah,

this mitzvah,

this mitzvah?

I'm fond of Nechama Leibowitz's analysis of the post-diluvial transformation.

After the flood,

human beings are permitted to consume other creatures for the first time,

right?

In sort of the ideal state of the Garden of Eden,

it seems as if,

and this is how Chazal understood it,

there was no license to consume other creatures.

And Nechama Leibowitz wants to say that there's some sort of a concession,

which is granted to humanity after the flood,

given that we have a bloodthirsty nature,

how are we going to channel that in the most constructive way?

So this reminds me of Rambam and Korbanot in a way,

right?

Sacrifices that even though God doesn't really like the sacrificial system,

what could he do?

The Torah has given it a certain time and a certain place where this is how people worship.

They can't imagine them worshiping any other way.

So God makes a concession and says,

you can do sacrifices,

but direct them towards me,

not towards idolatry.

And it seems like here,

too,

there's an element of,

in the ideal world,

we wouldn't be killing animals.

Because it does in some way impact our sense of compassion,

but human beings are who they are.

And if you demand everything,

you might end up with nothing.

And therefore,

I'm going to create lines,

which I hope will be sufficient in cultivating a certain attitude,

but not so restricted that people can't live with it.

Yeah.

And I'd go a step further.

I would say the lines that we're creating actually remind us of what that ideal is so that we don't forget what we're actually striving for and perhaps one day might reach.

So the Torah says to us,

listen,

you can consume other creatures,

but you better show respect for how you do that.

You better show respect for how you treat them.

And if you can cultivate the kind of character that the Torah wants us to cultivate,

then hopefully that will one day lead to something even greater.

I think that's what Nechama Leibowitz is arguing as well.

So even aspirationally,

we might want to aspire,

maybe not to complete vegetarianism or veganism,

but maybe more of it.

It might be a meritorious practice to limit how much animal products,

we consume in this vein.

Many Pardes students have told me over the years and they describe it in different ways that they're mushis.

You know what a mushi is?

Yes, I do.

That's a shout out to our friend,

Rabbi Aaron Potech.

I doubt he's listening,

but if he is,

meat only on Shabbat,

yamim tovim,

holidays and happy occasions.

There you go.

I never heard the happy occasions edition,

but that's what it is.

Well, that includes like bar mitzvahs and circumcisions and things of that nature where you're going to get to eat meat as well.

I see.

Okay.

So let's broaden out then to this question.

This question of,

and it's really connected,

the quote unquote danger or benefits of looking for reasons behind the commandments to begin with.

And I know that the sages addressed this issue,

and I'm curious to hear your take on how you would present that discussion.

Okay.

So all of this is really based on a Mishnah in Tractate Brachot and in Tractate Megillah,

a curious Mishnah where the Mishnah lists a number of statements that prayer leaders are not

permitted to make or they will be deposed by the congregation.

So just so people understand,

we're presumably talking about a time where the siddur or nusach,

the text of the prayer was not fixed.

There might have been a specific order even,

but people had the right to sort of improvise and fill in.

And the Mishnah tells us if the guy up there,

and yes,

it was a guy in those days,

uses this terminology as part of his poetic,

rapturous reaching out to God verbally,

you get rid of him.

You actually go up there.

The Gabbai goes up there and says,

Hey, you're out and turns over to Fred and says,

Fred, replace that guy.

Like in a baseball game where the coach comes out and says to the pitcher,

you're done.

So you have to help us understand what's going on there and how is it related to our topic.

Okay.

So there are three moments apparently when the prayer leader is going to be deposed.

We're going to focus on the first one,

but I'll mention the others as well.

The Mishnah says,

Haomer alkan tzipor yagiyu rachamecha va'al tov yizacher shemecha modim modim mishatkinah.

Mishatkinah tov.

If the prayer leader says your compassion reaches to the mother bird and may it reach to us.

That's one scenario.

Horrors is our reaction.

May your compassion reach to us as it reached the mother bird.

We depose that prayer leader.

That guy's out.

Okay.

Second situation,

the prayer leader says,

may you God be remembered for all the good that you bestow on us.

Al tov yizacher shemecha.

Implication,

but not for the bad.

Okay.

And finally,

if the prayer leader says,

and this is more familiar to us from our nusach today,

modim modim,

we praise you,

that blessing in the Shmona Esrei,

but they say it twice,

mishatkinah tov,

we silence that prayer leader.

So the second two,

and I think the scholars move in this direction,

say the second two are connected to a fear of like a Gnostic approach

that says there's the good God and the demi urge who's not so good.

And therefore there's an implication by either the duality of modim modim,

thank you and thank you,

or God,

I'm talking to the one who's remembered for good,

but that other God who does bad stuff,

I'm not referring to.

There's a fear somehow that people are going to start to think in less monotheistic terms.

But from that perspective,

the first one really stands out as a head-scratcher.

What is so terrible about pointing out God's compassion for the bird?

Because that seems to be very much in line with what Ibn Ezra and Rashbam and Rambam said.

It was compassion for the bird.

So what do the sages make of that?

So the sages,

there's actually disagreement in the Gemara on this point,

Rabbi Yosei Bar Avin and Rabbi Yosei Bar Zavida.

It's got to be like some kind of ironic joke that they both have the same first name.

Something about Yoseifs and their nicknames that make them very excited about this mission.

So Rabbi Yosei Bar Avin says,

It implies that God favors some creatures more than others.

And it sort of comes back to your point.

Why is there only a mitzvah

about the mother bird and not a mitzvah about other creatures and other circumstances

and other situations where we could imagine compassion not to be exercised?

Right?

So if you focus and say God has compassion on the mother bird,

that's how you understood what that statement was about,

then basically you are limiting God's compassion to this particular situation

where ostensibly it should be applied much more broadly.

Maybe that's what Ibn Ezra and Rashbam actually meant.

To try to solve and say,

no, it is applied more broadly.

We have to apply.

It more broadly.

So that's opinion number one.

Rabbi Yosei Bar Zavida says,

Because we are treating God's commands as expressions of compassion

and they're actually just divine decrees.

You know, it's interesting.

I know you're going to explain it,

but in my mind and I'm realizing this now,

the two are very closely related.

They both point to the potential problem,

or danger of trying to understand the character traits

or purpose behind the commandment,

right?

The first one is saying you're going to run into an inconsistency,

right?

You're going to basically get people to think about,

oh, God's compassionate here,

but not over there.

I don't understand God's compassion.

And the second one really invites the same problem.

The minute you start to apply human labels or understanding to the commandments,

you will again run into,

to various inconsistencies.

If God is so compassionate,

then why does he allow the selling of the young daughter as a slave

or the owning of slaves to begin with?

If God is so compassionate,

why does he allow the slaughter of animals at all,

right? You can imagine where this could go.

And I'm just wondering,

I never saw it.

Do you see that connection somehow?

Listen, I think the second opinion,

the one that says that God's commandments are decrees,

is basically canceling out the possibility,

that there's any compassion that we could understand rationally in the mitzvot.

It's a larger issue.

And again,

this sort of comes back to the divinity of the text,

the divinity of the Torah,

the divinity of the mitzvot.

If we understand that these things are from God,

then basically Rabbi Yossi Bar Zavida is saying,

forget about your human reason.

It means nothing.

We have one task,

which is to follow the commands.

And if you're going to apply human reasoning to the mitzvot,

then get the heck out of the,

you know,

the prayer service,

because you don't deserve it.

You don't deserve to be up there.

Because you are in some way demeaning,

you're saying,

Torah and the commandments.

By trying to bring them into a human level,

you are diminishing their divine authority and their divine source.

That would be the argument.

Although I should point out,

Rambam,

at least in the Guide to the Perplexed,

vehemently disagrees.

In other words,

Rambam says,

the point of the mitzvah,

of sending away the mother bird,

is to have compassion.

And that's reasonable.

That's rational.

That's what the Torah wants us to understand.

And therefore,

Rambam says,

I hold like the first view,

that says the issue is,

as if God would be distinguishing

or showing favoritism to one creature over another.

We don't want to make that statement.

But we're perfectly comfortable making the statement

that the mitzvot have a reason.

By the Mishnah Torah,

he also gives reasons for numerous commandments.

But in the Guide,

he also points out that

to not give reasons for the commandments

turns the Torah into something empty,

davar reik.

Right?

In other words,

in the Torah's wisdom is precisely

revealed when we understand the purposes

behind the commandments.

But we can't,

you know,

not acknowledge the danger.

And I think this danger occurs on a couple levels.

I'd love to hear where you stand.

On the one hand,

when we try to understand

the purpose of the commandments,

and the sages were aware of this problem as well,

the inevitable question of,

well,

I could achieve that goal better

if I did something else.

Right?

This commandment is not as effective

as this other system I could put in place

to generate the goal that's meant by

the commandment.

And of course,

this other element of,

perhaps I could say,

once I understand the reason,

I don't need the commandment,

right?

That's the famous one that even they say,

Shlomo HaMelech fell into.

If I understand what the commandment is coming to prohibit,

I don't have to worry.

I'm a very compassionate person.

I can take the mother and the egg

because I know what a kind,

loving,

good person I am.

It's not going to harm me.

It's for the other people who have to work on that.

So I think the Rambam is very careful not to fall

into that trap because when it comes,

to the codification in the Mishneh Torah,

the Rambam actually says something else.

And coming back to the question of the prayer leader

who says,

Alkan Tzipor Yagiyo Rachamecha,

Mishat Kino Tov,

we silenced that prayer leader.

Listen to what the Rambam says,

Mipnei She Mitzvot Elu Gezerata Katuv Hen

These mitzvot are divine decrees.

They are not about compassion.

If they were about compassion,

the Torah would not have allowed us

to slaughter an animal at all.

So he contradicts himself.

He contradicts himself,

but he's exactly addressing the point that you're making.

If you take these things as expressions of human reason,

and we then take them to their logical conclusion,

we will come to a place that ultimately is inconsistent.

So which Rambam do you like?

Do you want to go down the path of exploring reasons

for the Torah at the risk of them losing their authority?

Or do you want to go down the road of no,

it's better to view these things

as absolute commandments.

Don't dig into the reasons

because A, you won't find consistency

and ultimately that could actually reduce

your allegiance to following the mitzvah.

In Pardei style,

I would say we have to do both.

We have to apply our human reason

because God gave us a brain,

but we have to realize that there are limits as well

because we're human and God is not.

So the authority then lives above the reasons that we give.

Correct.

And I think the Rambam even in the guide would agree to that

even though he goes that extra mile,

of trying to explain every single mitzvah

according to a rationale.

Because for him, God would only do things that are rational.

Correct.

To describe God as irrational would be problematic.

So maybe you could say Rambam would say

if you're looking at God's view,

which is what our highest intellectual capacity

might get us close to,

you have to find reasons.

If you look at from our human level of doing these things,

we have to accept them as commandments

whether we understand it or not.

Great.

Wow, we came to an agreement.

That's very, very exciting.

So let's now take this one step further.

This idea of compassion.

Unfortunately, as we're recording this,

of course, there is still war going on.

And this question of compassion being in tension

with other needs of the Jewish people,

some would say to survive,

some would say to protect ourselves,

some would say to get our hostages back,

whatever it is,

we do find ourselves in a tension of values.

And I'm wondering, does this help us understand

that we will always be in tension?

That in other words,

that the compassion that we show the mother bird

is not an endless compassion

that we show in all cases or in all times,

because sometimes you can't afford to be compassionate

or sometimes compassion cannot be the first character trait

that leads your decision.

The human condition is a complicated one.

And I think it's important to understand that.

And to choose one value or another

and apply that to the nth degree

in any given situation

may not be the best way forward.

And I think the tension of human living

is to have these values which the Torah gives us

and then to attempt to apply them

in the lives that we're living

in the best possible fashion.

And it will not be possible

to hold by a particular

value in its ideal form

based on the other values

that are part of the discussion.

So if I follow your reasoning here,

which I think I like very much,

one of the things we can do with a parasha like this

filled with mitzvot

is to try to identify

the various values that are in play

and notice that many of them

are in tension with each other,

even the most basic level of what we call

din and rachamim, right?

Justice versus mercy.

And realize that there's no simple

laundry list or no simple instruction guide

about how we can live our best lives.

And the Torah does not really offer us

a responsibility-free way to make it through.

Oh, I'll just follow these rules

and I'll put a check next to each one.

But in fact, the Torah,

I think in a very deliberate way,

gave us multiple values

expressed through all the different,

different stories and laws of the Torah,

and then challenged us to figure out

how we maintain and prioritize

and live in the tension between,

well, I'll go to this example,

fighting our enemies on the one hand,

but, you know, releasing the mother bird

before taking the eggs with the other.

Listen, I agree with that,

but I think at the same time,

at least from my perspective,

we have some guidance.

It's not like we decide all these things on our own.

We have 3,000 years of tradition

to help us understand

how we might proceed

and which values perhaps will win the day

in a given situation

or have to win the day in a given situation.

And it could very well be,

from my perspective at least,

yes, survival is more important than compassion

if that's the choice I have to make.

And so therefore, at the end of the day,

we might even find there's machloket about it.

We might not even agree

about how to implement these values,

but in my mind,

that also changes the nature of a machloket, right?

If the machloket is not,

I'm good, you're bad,

but rather,

oh, you prioritize values in this way

and I prioritize in this way,

it's not that anybody's evil,

but we think and look at the situation very differently

or prioritize differently

is a very different discussion.

Yes, and you know,

if that can remain an academic debate,

wonderful, but very often it's not.

It impacts on our actual lives.

Not only impacts,

changes dramatically,

but at the same time,

we might disagree,

disagree with the choice that's being made strongly,

but at least I don't have to see the person as evil

who's making the decision

whether it's different than my own.

I think that's still an important piece.

Even though you're right,

ultimately we do have to decide,

which means one side is going to win

in any of these debates

and one side is not,

at least in the moment that we're in.

Right.

Well, I think we've had a great discussion today.

Michael, thank you very, very much.

Thank you, Steve.

I think my takeaways are,

number one,

the power of discussion and learning and thought

that one commandment can offer us.

And there's so many more in this Parsha.

And I think there's an invitation here,

not only to look at the commandment,

but as you said,

look at the discussion around the commandment

that ensues over the next 3,000 years

and see all the different perspectives

and debates and issues that can arise

from this one instruction

that almost nobody carries out.

Literally, I would say almost nobody.

Almost nobody.

Maybe one in five million.

And so there's something very exciting about that

and very challenging about that.

So we are indebted to you

for putting us on this path.

Thank you, Steve, so much.

It was a pleasure.

So on this note, again,

and we've been doing this too long, Michael,

but we still are at war

and our hostages are still not home safely.

So we still continue to offer our prayers

and our hopes that the hostages

will come home healthy and well,

that there will be peace

in the land of Israel

and the entire world will know

much happier, safer, better times.

Amen, Steve.

So on that note,

we want to wish all of you a Shabbat Shalom

and give us a listen next week.

Thank you again, Michael, very much.

Thank you, Steve.

Thank you for tuning in

to the Pardes Parsha podcast

recorded here at Nomi Studios in Jerusalem.

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